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Trust vs. Monitoring - A method to avoid the principal-agent problem on the example of Toyota
Trust vs. Monitoring - A method to avoid the principal-agent problem on the example of Toyota
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Trust vs. Monitoring - A method to avoid the principal-agent problem on the example of Toyota

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Seminar paper from the year 2006 in the subject Business economics - Business Management, Corporate Governance, grade: B, University of Applied Sciences Essen (IOM), course: Human Resource Management (MBA), language: English, abstract: The relationship between employer and employee or in general principal and agent is one of the important key determinants that lead to economic success within a firm. In this paper the relationship between principals and agents regarding an efficient performance of monitoring or trust instruments will be discussed. Having set the basic framework, the instruments to increase trust within the firm will be shown on the example of Toyota. In particular, it will be shown that these instruments increases overall economic success and have highly impact on the relationship of principal and agent.
ISBN
9783638799706
Språk
Engelsk
Utgivelsesdato
23.6.2007
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