Problems of Mind

First published in 1972, Problems of Mind begins with a consideration of the view that the human mind is an immaterial thing that does not require corporeal embodiment for its operations. It takes up the conception that "e;inner experiences"e; are "e;strictly identical"e; with brain processes. The book also deals exclusively with the doctrine called "e;Logical Behaviourism"e;, which will always possess a compelling attraction for anyone who is perplexed by the psychological concepts, who has become aware of the worthlessness of an appeal to introspection as an account of how we learn those concepts, and who has no inclination to identify mind with brain. The three most plausible theories of mind-body dualism, mind-brain monism, and behaviourism are all rejected, and nothing is set forth as the true theory. Norman Malcolm states that this is 'only a drop in the bucket. It will serve its purpose if it leads the reader into the writings of Wittgenstein, who is easily the most important figure in the philosophy of mind.' Problems of Mind will be an essential read for scholars and researchers of philosophy of mind, ethics, logic, and philosophy in general.