Gå direkte til innholdet
failure of Mill's qualitative distinction of pleasures
failure of Mill's qualitative distinction of pleasures
Spar

failure of Mill's qualitative distinction of pleasures

Les i Adobe DRM-kompatibelt e-bokleserDenne e-boka er kopibeskyttet med Adobe DRM som påvirker hvor du kan lese den. Les mer
Essay from the year 2008 in the subject Philosophy - Philosophy of the 19th Century, grade: Not yet graded, LUISS Guido Carli (LUISS Guido Carli), course: Applied Ethics, language: English, abstract: In reply to the standing objection that utilitarianism is a pig philosophy, John Stuart Mill (1806 - 1873) holds that Benthamite utilitarians "e;have fully proved their case"e; (II, 4) by pursuing quantitative hedonism which emphasizes the difference of quantity in pleasures . However, he still aims at taking a "e;higher ground, with entire consistency"e; (II, 4) to defend utilitarianism by introducing his later-called qualitative hedonism that is based on the difference of quality in pleasures in Chapter II of Utilitarianism. In the essay, I argue that Mill's qualitative distinction of pleasures is problematic and inconsistent with hedonism, to which he explicitly commits himself. As a result, instead of providing support for utilitarianism, it causes more problems.
ISBN
9783640235377
Språk
Engelsk
Utgivelsesdato
19.12.2008
Tilgjengelige elektroniske format
  • PDF - Adobe DRM
Les e-boka her
  • E-bokleser i mobil/nettbrett
  • Lesebrett
  • Datamaskin