The New Dual State

The New Dual State examines how authoritarian regimes can institutionalize judicial autonomy without relinquishing ultimate political control. Extending the dual state theory beyond its classical and contemporary formulations, Yueduan Wang argues that the consolidation of autocratic authority can clarify and stabilize the boundary between legal order and arbitrary power, thereby permitting limited judicial independence. Using China as the central case, the book shows how political centralization enabled the regime to insulate judges from local officials, suppress unsanctioned extrajudicial interventions, and channel politically sensitive disputes away from the courts through the repression of legal activism and the expansion of state-led mediation. These measures have produced a system in which courts demonstrate increasing professionalism and autonomy in routine cases, while the regime retains decisive authority over politically salient matters. Grounded in extensive fieldwork and framed by comparative legal theory, the book advances a compelling framework for understanding authoritarian legality.