In this age of specialism philosophers, like other specialists, tend to take in each other's washing. Here, perhaps imprudently, I attempt to break out of this pattern. Though I am by profes- sion a philosopher, I am addressing primarily, not other philo- sophers, but cultural anthropologists, sociologists, historians of ideas, and literary and art critics. Thus, while there are chapters in this book on metaphysics and political theory, I do not ask, "e;Is the doctrine in question true?"e; - which is the kind of ques- tion a philosopher might be expected to raise. Instead I ask, "e;What can we learn from this doctrine about the personality structure of the individual who framed it and about the charac- teristic drives of the society in which he lived?"e; My reasons for asking and for trying to answer this kind of question, instead of the usual philosophical question, are as follows: Though the material products of culture' and the overt behavior patterns of societies have long been objects of scientific study, the most characteristic products of high cultures - artistic productions like poems and paintings and' theoretical structures like metaphysical and scientific theory - have not as readily yielded to exact description and analysis. Not, of course, that there is not a very extensive discussion of these matters. But most of it is carried on in terms that are regrettably vague.