Social Choice and Public Reason

How is it possible to justify social choices to individuals when these choices unavoidably interfere with their freedom and when individuals disagree about most relevant considerations? This fundamental question about how to live together assumes pressing significance in contemporary liberal and open societies marked by unprecedented diversity and pluralism. While such diversity creates opportunities to improve lives, it also poses acute moral, political, and social challenges. In Social Choice and Public Reason, economist and philosopher Cyril Hédoin addresses these challenges by bringing together two major intellectual traditions: social choice theory and public reason liberalism. This book introduces a new framework for addressing how agreement and justification become possible in open societies: The Public Reason Model of Social Choice and connects this model with a game-theoretic account of rule-following behavior. It examines how this framework applies to complex societies characterized by deep moral pluralism and pervasive disagreement, identifying several forms of disagreement within the Public Reason Model. Additionally, it considers political institutions that enable public justification in open societies prone to moral disagreement. Drawing on normative economics, game theory, and political and social philosophy, Social Choice and Public Reason offers a novel and ambitious theoretical treatment of a foundational issue for contemporary liberal societies.