Marginality in Philosophy and Psychology

Discussing marginality from an analytic perspective and drawing on canonical theories by a diverse set of authors, such as Dilthey, Collingwood, Wittgenstein, Foucault, John McDowell, Susan Carey, Michael Tomasello, and Chris Frith, this book is an important contribution to ongoing debates on marginality among psychiatrists, psychologists, social scientists, and philosophers.

Psychology often resorts to overambitious theorizing due to a perceived pressure to justify its scientific credentials. Taking the cases of preverbal children and mentally ill patients, George Tudorie illustrates that applying overarching and unifying explanations to marginal subjects is problematic, arguing instead that those at the margins should be given their proper explanatory autonomy.

Tudorie examines recent cognitive theories on early development in children to reveal the difficulties of conceptualising the emergence of human abilities, while also demonstrating how cognitive accounts of psychosis, built around the typical concepts of ‘belief-desire-intention’ psychology, eventually falter. In doing so, he reveals that interpretation is not a route psychology can take at the margins, and calls for a clearer view of explanatory options in marginal cases.