Soviet National Income 1958-1964

Soviet National Income, 1958–1964: National Accounts of the USSR in the Seven Year Plan Period by Abraham S. Becker offers a rigorous reconstruction and analysis of Soviet national income during a critical juncture in postwar economic history. Using the Soviet National Income and Product (SNIP) accounting framework pioneered by Abram Bergson and colleagues, Becker presents independently compiled accounts for each year of 1958–1964 and for the plan year 1965 as originally envisioned in the Seven Year Plan (SYP). By reworking household income and expenditure flows, public sector financing, investment, and capital-output relationships, the study provides a comprehensive portrait of the Soviet economy under Khrushchev. Central to the analysis are the difficulties of valuation in a command economy—distorted prices, turnover taxes, subsidies, and agricultural price disparities—and the adjustments necessary to approximate factor cost and constant-price measures. These methodological refinements allow Becker to chart growth trends, resource allocation, and structural change with unusual precision, while also probing the limits of Soviet statistical transparency.

The results reveal both the ambitions and contradictions of the Seven Year Plan era. Growth slowed markedly compared to the rapid postwar decades, with per capita gains narrowing and agricultural stagnation undermining official targets. Military expenditures remained significant, though their accounting was obscured by budgetary categories. Investment continued at high rates but yielded diminishing returns, reflected in rising capital-output ratios. By juxtaposing ex ante SYP goals with ex post outcomes, Becker highlights the gap between Soviet planners’ aspirations and economic realities, showing how policy adjustments responded to agricultural shortfalls, shifting defense priorities, and fiscal pressures. Comparative chapters situate Soviet performance within broader international trends, contrasting consumption, investment, and structural change with those of Western economies. The study concludes that the economic retardation of the SYP years was not merely cyclical but symptomatic of deeper inefficiencies in Soviet planning and valuation practices, setting the stage for the hesitant reforms of the mid-1960s. For scholars of comparative economic systems, Becker’s work remains a foundational examination of how to measure—and interpret—growth in a socialist command economy.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1969.