Patton at Bay

For General George S. Patton, Jr., the battle for Lorraine during the fall and winter of 1944 was a frustrating and grueling experience of static warfare. Plagued by supply shortages, critical interference from superiors, flooded rivers, fortified cities, and the highly-determined German army, Patton had little opportunity to wage a fast armored campaign. Rickard examines Patton's generalship during these bitter battles and suggests that Patton was unable to adapt to the new realities of the campaign, thereby failing to wage the most effective warfare possible. By the beginning of the Ardennes offensive, Patton had crippled his worthy opponent, but had suffered the highest casualties of any campaign that he conducted during the war. Until now, his better known exploits in Sicily and Normandy have overshadowed this campaign. Relying on a broad range of sources, this treatment of Patton's operational performance in Lorraine goes beyond the official history. It describes Patton's philosophy of war and explains why it essentially failed in Lorraine. Supplemented by full orders of battle, casualty and equipment losses, and excellent maps, Patton at Bay is a penetrating study of America's best fighting general.