The Control of NATO Nuclear Forces in Europe during the Cold War

This book examines the development of command and control systems for nuclear weapons in NATO Europe during the Cold War. This is a reprint of his book originally published in 1993. The United States and Europe had for a long time stressed different aspects of their common concern for the control of nuclear forces. The US mostly feared a failure of negative control, ie the possibility of accidental or inadvertent use. The Europeans shared this concern but emphasized the need for reliable positive control of the deterrent, ie the assurance that it would function as planned in an emergency. Unsurprisingly, American views prevailed, and moved the UK and France to develop their own national deterrent.

Written at the end of the cold war, this book argued for the creation of a European deterrent, integrated with NATO, on the basis of the French and UK forces. Since then, these two countries have repeatedly discussed this issue, and that is why, twenty-five years after it was written, the conclusions of this book are still relevant for current policy. Renewed US unilateralism after the election of president Trump reinforces the notion that in the nuclear weapons domain, as in others, the Europeans should take more responsibility. The author holds a PhD in Defense Studies from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is a retired member of the international staff at NATO Headquarters.