
Reactive Risk and Rational Action
Bridging decision theory and the economics of institutions, the study demonstrates how insurance markets endure only when contracts create a “community of fate” between insurer and insured—making prevention, not just payout, the common objective. Methodological notes on how insurers model individuals and organizations complement analyses of warranties, sue-and-labor clauses, general average, salvage, and valuation rules, revealing why some hazards prove insurable and others do not. The concluding theory of reactive risk connects calculation to governance: when incentives and oversight are designed well, insurers can price rare events without inviting them; when they are not, markets unravel. The enduring takeaway is crisp and consequential: managing moral hazard is less about better odds and more about better institutions—insurance works when contracts strategically reshape behavior so that markets can function at all.
This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1985.
- Undertitel
- Managing Moral Hazard in Insurance Contracts
- Författare
- Carol A. Heimer
- ISBN
- 9780520318458
- Språk
- Engelska
- Vikt
- 363 gram
- Utgivningsdatum
- 2020-09-01
- Sidor
- 287