Environmental Policy Implementation Amid Shifting Democratic Trajectories

In this innovative book, Benedetta Cotta offers an in-depth examination of why European Union environmental reforms endure in some countries yet unravel in others, analysing the trajectories of waste legislation implementation in Hungary and Poland between 1999 and 2023. Introducing the novel concept of enduring implementation, policy performance that remains both durable over time and feasible for stakeholders under shifting political conditions, Cotta develops an original analytical framework contrasting actors’ demand for EU implementation with their capacity to supply it.

Drawing on a rich comparative analysis of Central and Eastern European case studies, the book identifies three mechanisms that make implementation enduring: market incentives that link profitability with EU rules, broad cooperation among public and private actors, and assistance alliances connecting domestic and external stakeholders. The book shows how recent authoritarian and nationalist governance has disrupted these mechanisms, showing how centralisation and reduced stakeholder participation undermine market dynamics and cooperation. The book highlights that enduring implementation depends not on transposition alone but on aligning incentives, cooperation and external alliances to ensure EU rules remain feasible and resilient amid democratic and political shifts.

Cotta’s insights will be essential reading for scholars of European integration, Europeanisation, policymaking, implementation, environmental policy, and Central and Eastern Europe. It also speaks to political economy researchers interested in the interplay between market incentives and cooperative policymaking. Beyond academia, this book offers valuable guidance for policymakers—including within the European Commission—as well as practitioners in waste management, environmental organisations, and international and domestic institutions seeking a deeper understanding of EU policy implementation on the ground.