Does subjectivism in value theory – the view that value is grounded onattitudes – imply that when we think and talk about what is good andbad we must necessarily be thinking and talking about our desires andother attitudes? • Does value subjectivism entail that evaluative utterancesare reports or expressions of the speaker’s attitude? • Are subjectivistscommitted to an axiology according to which only preference satisfactionis valuable for its own sake? • Are subjectivists disqualified fromtalking about intrinsic value? • Is it a consequence of subjectivism thatif we had different attitudes than those that we in fact have differentthings would be valuable? • Is subjectivism a view on which things canbe good or bad only by being good or bad for particular people? • Aresubjectivists committed to objectionable forms of relativism or egoism?• Is every form of idealization of attitudes in tension with the spirit ofsubjectivism? • Is subjectivism a bleak view on which nothing matters?In Value Grounded on Attitudes – Subjectivism in Value Theory, Fritz-Anton Fritzson defends subjectivist views against some common objectionsand offers a sympathetic formulation of value subjectivism.
Value Grounded on Attitudes
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