How can leaders craft political institutions that will sustain the peace and foster democracy in ethnically divided societies after conflicts as destructive as civil wars? Under turbulent conditions the leaders of ethnic groups, governments, and international organizations face the challenge of designing political arrangements that can simultaneously meet the tests of equal representation, democratic accountability, effective governance, and political stability. At critical junctures in the transition from intense (often violent) conflict, power-sharing arrangements may offer a compromise acceptable to most ethnic elites.

Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild find that these short-term accommodations come with high longer-term costs: the very institutions that provide a basis to end a conflict in an ethnically divided country may hinder the consolidation of peace and democracy over the longer term. The contributors to Sustainable Peace examine institutional settlements in Ethiopia, Lebanon, India, and South Africa as well as the Soviet successor states, south Asia, central Africa, west Africa, and the Balkans. Roeder, Rothchild, and most of the contributors conclude that power-dividing, rather than power-sharing, solutions are more likely to result in durable political compacts and peace.

Contributors: Amit Ahuja, University of Michigan; Eduardo Alemán, University of Houston; Valerie Bunce, Cornell University; Caroline Hartzell, Gettysburg College; Matthew Hoddie, Texas A&M University; Edmond J. Keller, UCLA; David A. Lake, University of California, San Diego; Benjamin Reilly, Australian National University; Philip G. Roeder, University of California, San Diego; Donald Rothchild, University of California, Davis; Timothy D. Sisk, University of Denver; Lahra Smith, UCLA; Christoph Stefes, University of Colorado, Denver; Daniel Treisman, UCLA; Ashutosh Varshney, University of Michigan; Stephen Watts, Cornell University; Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Université de Montréal

Sustainable Peace - pocket, Engelska, 2005